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Philosophy is nothing but the human quest for truth. From very remote time Indians 
are blessed with the spontaneous curiosity about what truth is. The first literature 
containing the truth realized by the ancient Indians is the Vedas. The philosophy revealed 
in this literature was more or less tuned with human helplessness together with submission 
to nature Gods. This went on unchallenged till the Buddha preached his new doctrine 
which afterwards brought about a head-on collision with the Vedic stricture, but the 
Buddha denied to give any positive answer to any Vedic approach and consequently in 
later period a gigantic philosophical system was built up against the Vedic philosophy or 
more accurately there rose a protest against the unverified doctrine. In the Brahmajiila-
suttaofDighanikiiya.Kathavatthu and the Upanisads we fmd that the philosophy has taken 
a challenging attitude by now l . The people also were clearly divided into two major 
groups. On the one hand, the Brahmins were there with the Vedic philosophy and on the 
other, the Buddhists came forward with their new philosophical doctrines. 
It was the beginning of the Christian era when such a situation was created that the 
Brahmin and the Buddhist philosophers considered their respective philosophical vi~ws 
unsuccessful if those were not directed against the opponent and at the same time not 
victorious. It is obvious that the introduction of the debate system was largely responsible 
for the creation of this situation. 
The fundamental difference in outlooks between realism and idealism led to mutual 
confrontations which continued in an unbroken line for generations of scholars resulting 
in the growth of a rich and vigorous literature. In this way a section of the Brahmin 
philosophers developed a philosophical system predominantly with the science of reason-
ing (nyilya). Later the system was known as NytIya philosophy. The first systematic work 
on the Nfaya philosophy is the Nyllya-siitra of Gautama. It is supposed to be a work of 
about ISO A.D. Going through this work, we can undoubtedly say that much before the 
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composition of this work the Buddhists had already put forward a lot of strong arguments 
that helped their views to give birth to a concentrated self-sufficient system of philosophy. 
We find in the Nyaya-siitra that Gautama refutes seve~ doctrines of the BUddhiJt 
philosophy, such as, the wh~le is not separate from ~s parts , momentariness of things, 
denial of the external object , voidness of everything and so on. But it should be kept in 
mind that these doctrines could not a5$ume the highly sophisticated forms by that time. 
And Gautama's refutation also does not show much complicacy of thought to turn those 
down. 
Then there is a century of silence. In this period the followers of these two schools 
obviously went on with their studies but. no remarkable work was composed. 
Now came ahead a Bud~ist scholar to protest against the views of Gautama. He is 
none other than Nagarjuna , who is the first outstanding philosopher to propagate the 
fundamental philosophy of voidness (sunyavaaa). Dr. Stcherbatsky seeks to explain the 
background of the advent of this school in this way, ..... Monism took the offensive and 
fmally established itself triumphantly in the very heart of a new Buddhism. Transplanted 
upon a fresh soil the old Monism produced a powerful growth of various systems. In the 
schools of Nagarjuna and Deva it recei'7ed a dialectical foundation, in the way of a 
dialectical destruction of all other systems ". 
In the Madhyamika-Kiirika, Nagarjuna tries to establish his theory of voidness by 
contradicting many of the actual Nyaya-slltra. He composed the oldest Buddhist treatises 
on the art of debate, viz., Vigraha-Vyflvartanl and Pramiina-vihetana. In Vigraha-vya 
vartani: going to prove the voidness of things Nagarjuna has shown his daring attitude of 
uprooting even the existence of the Pramil'!as. As he was an exponent of a particular 
'nihilistic' theory, naturally he could not also check the temptation of striking at the root 
of the categories proposed by Gautama. His Pramiu]a-vihe!ana is exclusively a refutation 
of the sixteen categories contained in the Nyaya-sutra. By applying his critical axe of 
relativity he claims that all the sixteen categories are realational and therefore ultimately 
unreal. 
This Buddhist theory of voidness was one of the crucial points for a Nyaya exponent 
named Vatsyayana. Going to prove his theory,the Buddhist Nagarjuna started with 
demolishing even the existence of the instrument of valid knowledge. But Vatsyayana 
started with a strong protest and a crucial defense of Pramana and the very first line of his 
commentary reads Prarriil1lato' rtha pratipattau prav[ttisiimarthyiid arthavat prama1am. 
Gautama formulated the sutras but NagaIjuna flayed them mercilessly and Viitsyllyana 
who belonged to the lineage of the Naiyayika was prompted to write a commentary on the 
Nyiiya-siitra in about the late 4th century or early 5th century. The commentary bears the 
title Nyaya-bhasya . 
. 
In course of explaining the Nyiiya-sutras, Vatsyayana raises objections against 
NagDrjuna's doctrine of voidness of things which is discussed in the Miidhyamika-karika 
according to which our means and objects of knowledge are as unreal as things appearing 
in a dream or exhibited in jugglery or as the city of the celestial choirs or as a mirage. 
VfU:sytlyana argues against the VijmmavlIda philosophy (i.e., the theory of idealism) on the 
Nyllya-siUras iv. 2. 26-7 and iii. 2. 11 and against the momentariness on the Nyiiya-siitras 
iii. 2.11-13. 
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To answer the objections raised by Vatsyayana, a Buddhist philosopher, Vasubandhu 
(c. A.D. 410-490), composed three works, vizg' Vada-vidhi. ViJda-vidhana and Vada-
hrdaya. But unfortunately all the works are lost. 
This philosopher however became also famous for propounding a fundamental doctrine 
of some Buddhists, the doctrine of idealism (Vijnanavada), as a sophisticated philosophy. 
As to the advent ofVijilanavada, Dr. Stcharbatsky says, "When NlIgarjuna's standpoint of 
extreme relativism was forsaken, the brothers Asatiga and Vasub~mdhu took up the study 
of Nyaya l~gic and the work of its adaptation to the idealistic foundations of this 
philosophy" . 
As all the logical works of Vasubandhu has been lost, so the complete assessment of 
his view on logic is not possible at present. From the later works it is found that 
Vasubandhu opposing the nature of perception and inference, the number and nature of 
the mgmbers of syllogism recommended in the Nyaya-sliJr.a,. gave new definitions of 
them} . He wrote his Vilda-vidhi challenging the laws regulatinifthe debate as advocated 
by Gautama. 
This dispute between the realism of the Nyaya school and the dogmatic idealism of the 
Vijnanavada school of Buddhist philosophy went on. But it was the 5th century A.D. 
when India gave birth to her glorious philosopher-logician son, Dignaga. In his hand 
Buddhist idealism assumed a critical shape. Dignaga'sPrama~a-samuccaya. perhaps the 
most outstanding one of his five worull, shook the world of Indian logic. Notwithstanding 
the truth the Buddhists realized, Buddhist philosophy was suffering from insufficiencies 
of details in logic for their own to establish their realization. Now with Dignaga, Buddhist 
philosophy got the elixir of life. Dr. S.C. Vidyabhusana writes, "Both in matter and in 
manner his works marked a distinct departure from those of his predecessors. The keenness 
of his insight and the soundness of his critical acumen combined tostamp him with an 
individuality all his own. No praise seems !-w. high for him. Indeed he may fittingly be 
styled as the first and last of Indian logicians ". 
Pramalla-samuccaya is a logical work written in An~~ubh metre. In this work Dignaga 
explains his own theories of Buddhist logic. By this Dignaga pushed the Buddhist 
philosophy in the duel ground where the Naiyayikas were the chief opponents. He 
criticizes a Nyllya view : Nyaya-siltra i. 1.12, enumerating the sense-organs, does not 
mention the mind, but the Naiyayikas admit it as a separate sense-organ. In support of 
their view they say that the mind can unhesitatingly be admitted as a sense-organ because 
nowhere in the Nyaya-sutra the view is contradicted. Now Dignaga says, well, if absence 
of contradiction means admission, there would have been no necessity at all of formulating 
this sutra because the group y~ sense-organs as mentioned there has not been contradicted 
anywhere in the Nyij~~-s14tra . A few more objections like the above can be found which 
are nothing but trivial 4. 
The crucial points of dispute are the definitions of perception pratyaksa and inference 
anumlina also with the definitions of probans (he~t) etc. given by Gautama. Refuting 
those Dignaga formulated fresh definitions of them} . Comparison (upamOna) and verbf 
testimony (Sabda) are not separate instruments ofvalidknowledge in the Buddhist view l . 
It is Digonga (¥ho for the frrst time draws attention to the theory of Apoha, i.e., the law of 
contradiction . It contains the view opposite to 'the view of knowledge gathered in a 
direct way'. According to this Apoha theory, the law of cognizance is explained as "we 
can actively cognize or determine a thing only by opposing it to what it is not". 
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A spark which ignited the criticism in the realistic philosophy is Dignaga's 'defmition 
of perception'. If the difference in the very basis appears too serious then that in the 
consecutive stages of development obviously turns to not only doctrinal dispute but also 
bitter relation in life. And exactly this happened in the later period. In the Nyiya 
philosophy being a realistic philosophy 'the knowledge resulting from sense-object 
contact' if also associated with terms is given the respect of nothing but perception and 
real knowledge. But reality, accord ing to Dignaga, is inextricably involved in causal 
efficiency. A fire which burns and cooks is a real fire. A fire which is absent, which is 
imagined, which neither really bums nor cooks nor sheds any light,is an unreal fire. A 
reality which is stripped off from every relation and every construction, which has neither 
any position in time and space nor any characterizing quality, cannot be expressed because 
there is in it nothing to be expressed. If we express that sensation in words, the thing to be 
expressed must be attached with some kind of mental imagination which pushes it to the 
real of unreality. Representing this view Dignaga's defmition of perception pratyaksam 
kalpanapo~ham has got the perpetuity. • 
In this way his observation of the truth rendered him into a perpetual enemy to the 
realistic group of philosophers. But whatever harm might have been to him, we have 
touched with a thrilling sensation of his revolutionary ideas. Unfortunately Infa could 
not protect any of the serious wolks of her worthy son from being lost for ever} . 
Time rolled on. Then came the seventh century. During this intervening period the 
Naiyayika philosophers exercised with their philosophy and logic but there was no one to 
put pen to paper. A Bharadvllja Brahmin Uddyotakara wrote an extensive commentary on 
Gautama' s Nyflya-siitra and Vatsyayana' s Nyi1ya-bhii~ya under the title of Nyaya-vartika. 
The very purpose of composing the work, as the author himself declared, was to write & 
expository treatise on the Nyllya-sutra to remove the veil of error cast by the quibblers . 
Th~ qu~iblers are none but Nilglhjuna, Vasubandhu, Dignaga chiefly and other Buddhist 
10glCJanS • 
It is quite natural that there are many things to be said for and against both the realists 
and the idealists. Uddyotakru'a carried out his duties as a realist But he is much more 
vociferous against the Buddhist doctrines. His temper can only be compared with that of 
Udayana. 
The first thing to be mentioned is Uddyotakl.ra's discussion and refutation of 
Nlg1lrjuna's doctrine of voidness in Nyaya-viJrtika under NS ii. 1. 8-19. In our world of 
cause and effect we cannot think of such a situation where there is no pramii,!a. The all-
powerful pramG'!O can by no means be discarded. Only what he has done is that he has 
set the pramanas on an invulnerable foundation. The definitions of perception and 
inference given by Vasubandhu and those as given by Oignaga are vehemently criticized 
in Nyllya-vrJrtika under NS i. I. 4-5. Oignaga is his Pramilna-samuccaya recorded a 
number of views regarding what actually is inferred in an inference and fmally expressed 
his own view. ~ this is discussed and Oign'!lga's views are criticized in Ny71ya-viirtika 
under NS i. 1. 52 . The definitions of proposition (pratijnal, probans (hetu) and example 
(dcs.~7mta) given by Vasubandhu and Dignaga are refuted in Nyiiya-vartika under NS i. 1. 
33-37. Uddyotaknra criticizes the law of debate as suggested by Vasubandhu, in Ny1lya-
vartika under NS i. 2. 1. Apoha theory has been refuted by him in Nyoya-vo.rtika under NS 
ii. 2.65. He also criticizes the denial of the evidences of comparison (upama.na) and verbal 
testimony (sflbda) in Nyiiya-vartika under NS i. 1. 6-7. He is actually on a criticizing spree 
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to refute the Buddhist theory in which the whole is viewed as identified with its parts, in 
Nyaya-v(Jrtika under NS ii. 1.33. He also records a series of pi1rvapak~a arguments. The 
later Naiyayika 10¥icians took up this Buddhist theory by the expression' identity of quality 
and the qualified' 2. 
The essence of the Buddhist philosophy lies in the doctrine of momentariness. In 
Nfoya-vartika under NS iii. 2. 10-17, Uddyotakara shows his erudition to refute the 
doctrine. 
In Nyaya-vartika under NS iv. 2. 26-37, Uddyotakara criticizes the Buddhist theory of 
'Denial of the external objects'. Some remarkable passages from this discussion may 
perhaps be quoted : "pleasure or pain is quite different from knowledge (jniina), for 
pleasure or pain is an 'object to be cognised' (griihya), while knowledge means its 
comprehension (graha,!a). The object cognised and the act of comprehension can never 
be identical. Secondly, the admission of illusory knowledge necessarily entails the 
acceptance of its opposite, i.e., valid knowledge also. An object which is never known 
rightly can also be never known falsely. Thirdly, one who does not admit the reality of 
any object other than mere consciousness will not be in a position either to defend one's 
own position or to refute that of other's, because one will not be able to communicate or 
explain anything to others with one's own mere consciousness which is intelligible to 
everyone else, just as the dream-experiences of a particular person are known to himself 
alone. To this, it may be replied that when a person defends his own thesis or refutes that 
of others he employs words and with the aid of 'consciousness as endowed with the 
word-fonn' (i'abdiikiira-citta) communication· orexpianation becomes possible, con-
sciousness as endowed with the word-fonn is not unintelligible to others. The reply 
however does not fit in, for the Vijrumavadins do not admit the reality of sabda as an 
external object and hence, they cannot speak of consciousness as endowed with the 
word-fonn. Fourthly, on the claim that no external object apart from consciousness eXists 
really, no distinction can be made between the states of dream and waking, for, in that case, 
objects will be equally non- existent always". 
What Uddyotakafa says against the soul the9!Y of the Buddhist has been more or less 
followed by the Nyaya logicians of later period 3. 
Uddyotakiira criticized the Buddhists a lot. But he never mentioned the name of any 
particular work or philosopher except in a single case where the names of the two works 
Viida-vidhi and Vada-vidhiina-tika are mentioned. Though in most of the cases we come 
to know whlMhat particular philosopher or logician is, he perhaps thought it would be 
sufficient to know that the refutation was directed against the Buddhist whoever he might 
be, an eminent one or an ordinary one. 
Some argue that the mode of Uddyotakara's refutation of the Buddhists is concerned 
more with verbal trickery than with true philosophical insight. It is found that while 
refuting a Buddhist theory he poses a number of alternative as to the opponent's theory, 
as if he is asking the opponent in front to answer those. But, he tries to show, not a single 
alternative is per missible and the only alternative which is found left does nothing but 
prove the Nyaya view. Probably this charge against Uddyotakiira is partly true. Though 
&enerally Uddyotakaraallows this kind of style and sometimes does not hesitate to distort 
the opponent's view, still in some cases he sticks to actual philosophical stand, which is 
found to be adopted continuously by the Nyaya logicians of later period. 
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But Nyi'Jya-wirtika could not reign unchallenged in the field of Indian philosophy for a 
long time. In the middle of the. 7th century challenges came from one of the famous 
Buddhist philosophers, Dharmakirti. 
This philosopher has written seven logical works, the celebrated "seven treatises", 
which have become the fundamental works for the study of logic in the Buddhist 
community and have more or less surpassed the works of Dignaga. Among the seven 
works the Praml1nu-l'iirtika is the chier one, written in mnemonic verse; the next work 
PramcIJa-vinisca);a is an abridgment of the first, written in stanzas and prose; the Nyaya-
bindu is a further abridgment of the same subject; Hew-bindu is a short classification of 
logical reasons; Samballdha-parik!i.a or an examination of the problem of relation is a small 
tract in stanzas with the author's own comment; Vada-nyaya is a treatise on the art of 
carrying on disputation and Sallfanallfara-siddhi is a treatise on the reality of other minds, 
directed against solipsism. 
The Pram'(lIJa-vartika was lost in India but we are lucky enough that the manuscript of 
this work hasbeen discovered by Rahul Sankrityayana from Tibet. 
In this pioneering work, Dharmak1rti discusses his own philosophy of idealism, general-
ly by giving up the temptation of pricking the opponent's view. Though some refutations 
of the Nyaya views are found there, still its own remarkable philosophy and logic 
spontaneously inundated the castle of Ny1\ya philosophy, built by Uddyotakarn. 
He criticizes the Nyaya view of the existence of God in the chapter calledPramli1}asid-
dhi (verse Nos. 12-18). The Nyaya view of perception is criticized in Pralyak~a chapter 
(verse Nos. 136-40). The theory of generality (verse Nos. 145-48) and the theory of the 
existence ofthe whole also (verse Nos. 149-53) are refuted. The Nynya definition of Paksa 
is refuted in Pararthiinumiina chapter (verse Nos. 164-71). In the same chapter the 
definition of pratijlia also (verse Nos. 172-75) is criticized. But all these are matters of 
general logic. 
"Although produced by a stimulus coming from an external object, but from an 
absolutely property-less pure object, is it indeed a reality? It is supposed to be absolutely 
stripped off from every vestige of an imaginative or constructive element. But is it not 
pure imagination ?" No. "A single moment, just as an absolute particular, is not something 
representable in an image, it cannot be reached by our knowledge, that is to say, it is not 
something empirically real. But it is the element which imparts reality to all the others. It 
is the indispensable condition of all real and consistent knowledge._ It is Q'ansempirical, 
but it is not metaphysical, it is not a 'flower in the sky' .... Dharmakirti proposes to prove 
its reality by an experiment in the way of introspection. The metaphysical entities are 
metaphysical just because they are pure imagination, just because there is no point of 
reality, no moment of pure sensation to which they could be attached. They are 
'unattainable as to place, time and sensible quality'. But this point and this sensation are 
present, directly or indirectly, in every act of empirical reality and empirical cognition. 
This we can indirectly prove by introspection. Dharmakirti says That sensation is 
something quite different from productive imagination -- can be proved just by introspec-
tion. Indeed, everyone knows that an image is something utterable (capable of coalescing 
with a name). Now, if we begin to state at a patch of colour and withdraw all our thoughts 
on whatsoever other (objects), if we thus reduce our consciousness to a condition of 
rigidity, (and become as though unconscious), this will be the condition of pure sensation. 
If we then, (awakening from that condition), begin to think, we notice a feeling (of 
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remembering) that we had an image (of a patch of colour before us), but we did not notice 
it whilst we were in the foregoing condition, (we could not name it) because it was pure 
sensationu24• This coruscative observation has given Dharmakirti immortality in the 
history of Indian philosophy. 
sahopalapfhaniyamad abhedo llilataddhiyoi.z!bhedasca bhrdntivijniinair drsyaten-
ddviviidvayi II, a verse of Pramlina-viniseaya is one of the most remarkable repre-
sentation of the idealistic philosophy of Dharmakirti. Practically there is no opponent 
philosopher who did not criticize this verse. 
Even then Dharmakirti was not unaware of the danger to which Idealism may ultimately 
lead in the shape of its direct consequence, solipsism. He therefore singled out this problem 
from his great work and devoted to it a special tract under the title SantanQntara-siddhi. 
i.e., EstabHshment of the existence of the other minds. This work contains a verification 
of the wh~le of DharmakIrti' s epi~temology in its application to a special complicated case 
Dharmakirti makes a gift to us of this brilliant piece of document narrating the realistic and 
Buddhist position in a problematic matter in the day. 
He however did not want to discuss about a metaphysical entity. which is a compulsory 
matter of discussion for the Nyaya logicians. It is said that Dharmakmi, when studying 
under Isvarasena wrote the chapter on Buddhology in Pramdna-vartika. But this religious 
part was dropped in all the other treatises and he himself most emphatically and clearly 
expresses his opinion in the closing passage of Santani'lntara-siddhi, " ... Our knowledge 
being limited to experience. we neither think nor speak out anything definite about Him, 
we can neither assert nor deny His existence26u• . 
For a century, from Dharmak1rti's time down to the 1st quarter of the 8th century, 
Buddhist philosophy was conspicuous by the absence of any remarkable original work due 
to absence of any talented philosopher in their school. At last a brilliant ~omposition from 
the Buddhist school came to light. It is the Tattvasarrtgraha. Its author Santaraksjta (A.D. 
705-65) was a professor at Nalanda. He visited Tibet at the invitation of king Khri-sron 
deu-tsan (8th cent.). The king with tht; assistance of Santarak~ita built in 749 A.D. the 
monastery of Sam-ye in Tibet, and San~ita was its first abbot. It is sure that 
TattvasaTflgraha was composed before its author had gone to Tibet He as elabomte1y 
explains the Buddhist doctrines of his own line as he vehemently criticizes the Nynya 
views. 
Dharmakirti's Pramiina-vartika was then inaccessible. The Tattvasamgraha throws 
literally a flood of light on Buddhist metaphysics of the Sautmntika-Yogac'ara school and 
logic and epistemology. The most remarkable feature of this work is its reproduction of 
the views of scholars who otherwise would have remaine~ in perfect oblivion. Kamala:Ua 
gives the names of the authors and quotes from them .... " 7 
From the study of this work along with Uddyotakara's Nyaya- vartika and Kumarua's 
works one can fruitfully gather some ideas about the philosophical activities of the 
centuries. The attack on realism, on the Soul theory and on the infallibility of the Vedas, 
provoked simultaneously the Nyaya, and Kumarila's Mimamsa schools. This counter-
criticisms of the orthodox stalwarts succeeded in undermining the prestige of the Buddhist 
monastery. But the Buddhists were not Supine and reacted with vigour and nerve. The 
Tattvasamgraha preeminently represents this phase of the Buddhist reaction. In fact, 
DharmaIdrti started to criticize directly the MIrofupsa school and as a result Kumarila tried 
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to take revenge on the Buddhists. Naturally it was 1I0t possible for Santaraksita and his 
disciple Kamalaslla, to keep silence against Kumarila's criticism. . 
We are hfre concerned with the conflict between the Nyaya and the Buddhist. There-
fore from S1intaraksita's criticism of the Nyaya views, particularly of Uddyotakara, it 
appears that as Saniaraks.ita ~d Kamruasila (c. A.D. 750) accepted Sautrantika view in 
which the external object exists (though this existence can be proved only by inference), 
it has been easier for them to criticize the realist's objections. 
In Tattvasamgraha, Uddyotakiira's views on the part and the whole (verse Nos. 560-62, 
583,592-98), on momentariness (verse Nos. 370-84, 388,466-67,471-75), on Apoha 
(verse Nos. 981-99, 1184- 99), and on Soul (verse Nos. 180-84, 195-216, 220) are 
criticised. 
There were other famous logicians al~~ in the intervening period. They were Bhavivik-
ta, A viddhaIcarna and Sluikarasvamin . Bhlivivikta may be prior to Uddyotakru-a. 
Bhnvivikta's BhiifYa!lkli and Aviddhakaqta's Tattva/lka are known to u~ only by name. 
Anyway, those Naiyayika logicians were "pillars" of the system. Santarak~ita and 
KamalaSlla naturally attacked them. Many minor views of these scholars are found 
mentioned and criticised in Tattvasarrgraha and Pa'1ijikil. 
> 
Here one among many of the objections can be mentioned to assess San~ita and 
KamalaSlla as to how far the objection was justified. What we call existence, !hey are 
never tired of repeating, is always related to an action. 'Existence is worlc' says Santarak-
sita. It is an anthropomorphic illusion to suppose that a thing can exist only, exist placidly, 
exist without acting, and then, as it were, suddenly rise and produce an action. Whatsoever 
exists is always acting. The conclusion that whatsoever really exists is a cause is urged 
upon the Buddhist by his defmition of existence quoted above. Existence, real existence, 
is nothing but efficiency. Consequently what is non-efficient, or what is a non-cause, does 
not exist. 'A non-cause' , says Uddyotaldira, addressing himself to the Buddhist, 'is double, 
it is for you either something non-existing or something change less'. KamalaslIa corrects 
this statement of Uddyotakara and accuses him of not sufficiently knowing the theory of 
his adversaries, 'because', says he, 'those Buddhists who are students of logic maintain 
that a non-cause is necessarily a non-reality'. This means that to be a real is nothing but 
to be a cause, whatsoever exists is necessarily a cause. 
The growth and development of the ideas and the sentiments of these two different 
groups of philosophers have been reflected in a rich literature which can make the subject 
extremely interesting. 
Now with San~ita and KamalaSiia, the Buddhist philosophy is in a safe situation, 
but on the contrary the Nylya philosophy was rather pushed to the wall without any brilliant 
logical production up to the middle of the 9th century from the time of Uddyotakiira. In 
this situation, Vacaspati Misra (c. A.D. 841)29, a Brahmin logician wrote an elaborate 
gloss on the Nyaya-viirtika under the title Nyaya-vartika-tiitparya-~1ii. 
In the writing of Vacaspati we fmd his exemplary observation of the logical nuances 
which can rarely be found in others. He possessed the rare qualities of erudition and 
faithfulness of representing the opponent's views. As a Nyllya exponent he followed 
Uddyotakara in refuting the Buddhist doctrines but not always without some differences 
of opinion. Hisrefutation is much more deep and subtle in comparison with Uddyotakiira's 
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refutation, being pungent and aggressive. Under NS i. 1. 4-5, TIka shows us Vacaspati's 
clear understanding about the nature of the Buddhist perception and inference. 
Vacaspati quotes the relevant verses of Dignaga while explaining Yddyotakara's 
refutation of Dignaga. He found the fresh scope of refuting Dharmakirti's views §If 
perception and others. He quoted verses of Pramii'!a-viirtika and fj:am711l .. a-viniscaya . 
The verse of Tattvasamgraha is found to have been quoted in TiM but it seems that 
Vacaspati did not give much importance to that text. ' 
Up to the time before Vacaspati, God was not so much considered to be a matter of 
dispute in debate with the Buddhists. But starting with him, to prove or to refute the 
existence of God became a prestige issue. 
Generally it is found that a philosopher having faith in a certain philosophical system 
cannot show his adherence to another philosophical system. When a philosopher in course 
of explaining seeks the permanent justification of the doctrine containing in the philosophy 
of his own like and tries to adopt those in thought and practice, it is very difficult for him 
to make his mind agree to give importance to another system of philosophy. Vicaspati is 
rather a conspicuous exception. He wrote three cOlllmentaries, Nyaya-vartika-tiitparya:. 
tiM on Nyaya philosophy, Sii'!'khya-tattva-kaumudi on Sarpkhya philosophy and Bliiimati 
on Vedanta philosophy. We do not know which one of them he preferred Rut in all the 
three commentaries, his coruscative explanation of the different doctrines makes us believe 
that none, in actuality, is negligible. Now even after a long journey we are struck with 
doubt if the objections against the Buddhist philosophy actually forbid us to believe in it 
Now the objections against the Buddhists came from a new direction -- Kashmir. After 
Vacaspati there flourshied another talented Nyaya logician named Jayanta Bhatta (A.D. 
840-9(0) who was the younger contemporary of Vifcaspati. He wrote an indePendent 
commentary on the Nyaya-slltra, called Nyaya-manjan. 
He was an orthodox Brahmin who zealously defended the authority of the Vedas and 
saw the refutation of Buddhism as a religious cause. Yet he was no fanatic. He was capable 
of retaining his sense of humour under adversity. He tells us that as he writes Nyaya-mafi-
jan he is being held prisoner in a cave and "I have beguiled my days here by this diversion 
of writing a book31". A rare virtue which is indicative of true greatness is his humility in 
declaring that he could lay no claim to originalitl2• 
Many of the Buddhist views are mentioned and refuted in Nyliya- malfjari~ such as, 
there are only two instruments of valid knowledge, perception is conceptual construction 
which is free from determination by the imagination and is non-illusory33, Apoha, 
momentariness, two theories of illusion --asatkhyliti (of the Madhyamikas) and lltmakhyiiti 
(of the Vijnanaviidins), etc, Among these the Buddhist theory of momentariness exhausted 
Jayanta's maximum energy. 
It is needless to say that DharmakIrti amon"p the Buddhists is no doubt the main opponent 
of Jayanta. Numerous verses from Dharmakirti's Pram1ina-viirtika have been quoted and 
refuted in Nyaya- manjan. Dignaga also is occasionally mentioned. Dharmottara(c. A.D. 
829) also is criticised by Jayanta in a few places34. 
It is a perpetual matter of dispute wHether knowledge is like the eye or a candle. The 
philosophical discussion, however, about knowledge has been divided into two groups on 
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the basis of these two differences. And this stretched long. Naturally to refute the 
Vijffi'lnavadins we find this kind of discussion made in a great detail in Nyiiya-manjan. 
After Dharmak:lry. the Mimamsa school turned up against the Buddhists. Kumarila (c. 
8th cent.) a great Mimfupsaka scholar attained great success in refuting them and estab-
lishing his opinion. But it was a fact for the Naiyayikas that an old enemy is vanquished 
by a new enemy. 
Prabh8kara (c. late 8th cent.) another strong Mlmal1lsaka scholar played the same role. 
So the Naiyayika scholars thought it necessary to stop the group of these new enemies. 
Properly going through Nyaya-manjar1, it however appears that Jayanta was also 
attentive to the refutation of the Mimamsa views of Kumarila as well as of Prabhakara. 
Actualiy with the decline of Buddhism in India the doctrinal and logical conflict was shifted 
to between the Nyilya and the Mim~sa schools of philQsophy. It will not be improper to 
say that Jayanta accelerated the criticism against the MimaIpsa school though it is found 
to have been started long before by Uddyotaltiira and rather prominently by Vacaspati. In 
fact, Jayanta had to protect the Nyllya philosophy from the attack not only of the Buddhists 
but also of different groups of other philosophers. In spite of this Jayanta has retained his 
renown by faithfully representing the opponent's views. 
Over and above, the activities of the Buddhists are not consistent with what they say. 
That is why Jayanta also was very much aggressive against them. He says: "You, 
Bauddhas. hold that there is no soul, yet you construct caityas (towers) to enjoy pleasure 
In paradise after death; you say that everything is momentary; yet you build monasteries 
with the hope that they will last for centuries; and you say that the world is void, yet you 
teach that wealth should be given to spiritual guides. }¥hat a strange character, the 
Bauddhas possess, they are verily a monument of conceiC3 • 
In the 10th century the Nyaya system of philosophy is divided into two courses. One 
flowed in the old line and the, other course started with Bhasarvajna. To put it clearly. 
Bhi\sarvajiYa was the first known proponent of a number of doctrines which diverge boldly 
from the accepted traditional views. A Kashmirian like Jayanta, Bhasarvajrl'a must have 
been flourished contemporaneously with him (c. A.D. 860-920). 
NyayabhUs.a,!a is a monumental work composed by him. It is an auto-commentary of 
Nyiiyasiira. It was supposed to be the lost for a long time, but it is a miracle that perhaps 
the only manusclipt of Nyayabh~01Ja has been suddenly discovered from the personal 
custody of Satya Swamp Shastri, in 1959. 
Profuse quotations and verses from Dharmak1:rti's Praniif'!a-vtJrtika and Praji'iakara's 
Pramii'!a-vnrtika-alQ1VkOra are fO.!1nd in this work. He criticizes)he views of NagiiIjuna, 
Vasubandhu, Dignaga, Dharmakirti,PraJ'i13kara, Dharmottara, San~ita, Kamal~la, 
Karnagomin and many others. Prajiiakara (c. A.D. 940) started the philosophical school 
of uiterpretation of the Prama'!a-vartika. He wrote a voluminous commentary on 
Pramana-vartika under the title Pramiina-vartika-allW]ktira. 
Now appeared in the field a great Buddhist scholar named Jilimairlmitra. He was 
associated with the VikramaSila ma.hlivihara which was established by the famous Buddhist 
emperor DharmapaJa (c. A.D. 770-810) and flourished under the liberal patronage of his 
successors. In the 11th century. we fmd it in the form of an international University 
attracting scholars from other parts of Asia. All the Shastras were taught in it Buddhism 
48 
received priority among them. There were six great Erudites there. Four of them were 
called keepers of the four .gates -- Dvarapal!ditas of the seat of leaming that was the 
mahivih8ra and the two others, still greater, were called the two "Great Pillars" of wisdom. 
We find JiiDnaSrimitra as the second Great Pillar of this University. He tried to revive the 
Buddhist philosophy against the attack of the Nyaya logic. 
He critic~~s the views of Trilocana and his discip:e Va'caspati. Bhlisarvajna and a few 
other Naiyllyika logicians with the ubnost strength of his intellectuality. His writing on 
the one hand ascends the acme of intellectual analysis and on the other hand unveils the 
background ofUdayana's arguments. Among those who were refuted by him, Trilocana 
was a dom~Ft figure between Kamalafila and Vacaspati to receive the special attention 
of JiUmasii • Anyway, Jnanasri was more concerned with the views of Bhiisarvajna, a 
strong opponent who flourished immediate!}' before him. It is known that Trilocana 
composed a worl!.: under the title Nyaya-prakirnaka. We do not know whether this worl!.: 
is the same as the Nyiiya-bhll~ya-tika. composed by him. One Nfoya-mdiijaii also was 
attributed to him. But unfortunately we do not find any of his works. 
Vittoka37 must have been a Nyaya author of considerable importan,9C. His views on 
TsVaravada alone have been recorded by Jnanasri and his disciple Ratnakirti. It seems that 
he wrote a treatise on TSvara. 
Sati.nanda38 is the last Naiyayika whose view on Isvara alone has been quoted by 
Jnanasrimitra. 
It appears from his writing that being a teacher at Nalanda, J niiiaSrl directly realized 
the insult coming from the Nylya logicians. But though Jayanta and Bhiisarvajffa criticized 
the Buddhist doctrines very strongly, the wannness of opposition cannot be realized on 
their body. But Joanasn and flfter him Udayana boiled over the dispute. They directly 
perceived the h~t of hostilitl . 
The biggest tract composed by him is on momentariness. To establish the theory of 
momentariness, the verse: yat sat tat ks,afljkam yathajaladhara!t santasca bhO.vo. imelsatta 
!aktirihllrthakarmaQimite" siddhe§u siddhii na salniipyekaiva vidhanyadiipi parak(nnaiva 
kriya vii bhavedldvedhlIpi k~a,!abhaiigasa"Jgatiratab sl1dhye ca viframyatiJI was 
emanated from his pen and got the honour of fulcrum of the theory. Apoha. anupalabdhi 
and invariable concomitance (vyaptiJ were discussed in a great detail. On God, JoanaSri 
made such a heating discussion under the title ls'varavada, that practically this aroused in 
Udayana's writing an assaulting attitUde, later. 
Ratnaldrti, a worthy disciple of Jlidnaslimitra. in his ten small treatises on different 
topics, tried to refute the Nylya philosophy.He gave more attention to refute Trilocana and 
Vacaspati rather than Bhasarvajil'a. A close scrutiny reveals that Ratnakirti has sum-
marized the works of his guru in many cases and the debt has also been eloquently 
acknowledged. But the fatal thing that Ratnakirti did, is his writing a treatise Santifntm-
tara- d~a,!am and it is a great risk of invitin~ solipsism which scared Dhannakirti and led 
him write SantUnantarasiddhi. But Ratankirti was daring enough to compose a worl!.: 
refuting the crucial view of their honoured-by-all preceptor. 
Jnanasrimitra made his last try to ameliorate the injuries inflicted by Vacaspati and 
B hasarvaj/ra on the Buddhist philosophy, but their philosophy again gota mortal hurt, when 
a Hindu logician Udayana (A.D. 984) composed two pungent works under the titles 
Nyaya-kusum7Jfija/i and Atmatattvaviveka. 
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The fundamental philosophy of momentariness and the denial of the existence of God are 
challenged in these two works, Atmatattvaviveka is mainly devoted to the refutation of the 
Buddhist doctrines of Soul. It criticizes several Buddhist views like those of Universal 
flux, Apoha. Universals, unity of knowledge and its object. Citradvaita, Vijfi'aIiavada, 
identity of the quality and the qualified, self as knowledge alone, fs'varavada, Sarv_ajnavada, 
etc. In most of the topics Jnanasrimitra's works supply the purvapak~C!.. Jnliilas'rimitra has 
been quoted and referred to by name. Everything is obviously to prove the existence of 
God. It can humorously be said here that God will himself intend to exist no more, if He 
comes to know that his existenc~ depends on so much painstaking efforts done in 
Atmatattvaviveka. In fact, Jti'$asn gave a heavy jerk to the Nyaya view of the existence 
of God as for which Udayana had to compose a separate work against that. In the practical 
life the bitterness travelled so penetratively between the Buddhists and the Naiyayikas that 
a controversy was decided (So goes the story) even by way of jumping from a palm tree. 
Udayana was very much proud of thinking himself as a protector of God. Here is his 
utterance: "Oh Lord, you have been puffed up with pride as you are now illustrious (when 
I have made you safe after defeating the Buddhists) and dare ignore me. But (be sure) 
when the Buddhists come again, your existence will depend upon me,,40. . 
The continuous hurt inflicted by the Nyaya logicians made the Buddhist philosophy 
helpless to survive in the common mind. It is also a point that after Jruthasrimitra there 
was no Buddhist scholar who could efficiently hold up their philosophy. Many workS 
undoubtedly were composed but those lacked sharpness of original thinking41. In fact, 
from the 10th century the struggle for existence of the Buddhists in India due to Muslim 
aggression over the Buddhist education centres was the main cause of unproductiveness 
of a brilliant philosophical literature for them. But the gradual fall of Buddhism in India 
was noticed much before. Dr. Stcheroatsky writes, "Notwithstanding the great scope and 
success of his propaganda he (Dharmakifti) could only retard, but not stop the process of 
decay which befell Buddhism on its native soil. Buddhism in India was doomed. The most 
uyented propagandist could not change the run of history. The time of KumIDila and 
Sankarifcarya, the great champions of Brahmanical revival and opponents of Buddhism, 
was approaching. Tradition represents Dharmaklrti as having combated them in public 
disputations and having been victorious. But this is only an after- thought and a pious 
desire on the part of his followers. At the same time it is an indirect confession that these 
great Brahmin teachers had met with no Dharmakirti to oppose them,,42. 
But in the Nyaya line two commentaries at least on Udayana's Atmatattvaviveka (alias 
Bauddha-dhikkara), one Bauddha-dhikkara- tika by Sarikara Misra (A.D. 1450) and the 
other Bauddha-dhikkara-siromafJi by Raghunatha Siromarti (A.D. 1477-1547) extin-
guished the last hope of the Buddhists to escape from the trap of the Nyaya logic. 
In SaIikara Misra's VTJdtvinoda Jnanasn's name is found in the list ofthe foremost Buddhist 
logicians. But during Saitkara's time the Buddhist works lost much of their importance 
as they were historical documents rather than part and parcel ofliving faith in India.NOTES 
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Brahmajala·sutta: vide a History oflndian Logic, pp.227-29 
Katha-vatthu : vide -do- pp. 23440 
Upanisads : vide -<10- pp. 3 
2 2.NS iv. 2.6-11 
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3 NS iii. 2.10-17 
4 NS iv. 2.26-37 
5 NS iv. 1.37-40 
6 H. Nakamwa gives the date. of NaprjuDa .. c. lSO-2S0 A.D. vide Iodian Buddhism, p. 23S 
7 .BL.I, p.22 
8 Porinfonnali~ ~vide BL.l. pp. 29-30 
9 BL.I.p.2? 
10 Ddinitioo of perDI!pIioo ~tatorthat vijoanam pllllyabam, i.e., Pereeption is cognition CODling from that IIIIIDC 
object. 
Defioitioo of iDfenmce : UlDtariyatartha-dananam tadvido'numanam. i.e..lDfereace is the c:ognitioo of a 
thing which is invarably concxmitant 00 the part of one who knows the said coruxxnitance. Definitioo of 
thesis : sadhyatmdhanam pnllijaa, i.e., Thesis is the mentioo of the probandum. Defmitioo of probans : 
hetnrvipabad viaesah, i.e., Probans is that which is disconnected frem where the probandum is known to 
be absent. 
11 Plamma-samuocaya ('lib. Tilbad-ma Kun-ias btus-pa), Nyaya-praveaa ('lib. Tilbad-ma riga-par 'jug-pa'i 
sgo), Hetu-cakm-hamaru ('rib. gTIID-tshigs~ 'thor-logtaD-la dbab-pa), Alambanapariba (Tab. dMiga-pa 
brlaa-pa) and Trikala-pariba (Tib. Dus gaum brtag-pa). 
12 A History of Indian Logic, p. 270 
13 na sukbadi pnvoeyam va mano vastvindriylllPnlm/ 
anisedbad upattam ced anJeDdriyanum vrthaIl 
Quoted in NVIT. vide Catur. pp.23S-6 
14 "Dignaga laughs at Vatayayma by saying that the Naiyayika (Aksapada) takea pride in bonowing his 
definition of pen:cpcion (pnItyaksa) from the Sutra of the VaiaeaikaJ, va., that pereeptioo is knowledge 
whichariaesfremtheinten:ouraeofthesouJwiththemind,themindwithaaenae-organ,andtheaenae-organ 
with its object. The Naiyayika il however careful not to connect hil perception with gmeralicY (Iamanya), 
particularity (visesa), subilllDce (dravya), quality (guna) and action (Kanna) 00 which, .. poiJlted 0Ill by 
Dignaga, the Vaisesika's inten:ourae is dependent. Oh I what a ItrIUlge cooaistency". 
A History of Indian Logic, p. Z79 
IS Definitioo of perc:eptloo : pratyaksam kalpanapodham, i.e., perc:eptloo is that which is free from mental 
cooatrudioo. Defmitioo of inference: anumeye'tba tattuJ.ye sadbhavo naatlta'sati, i.e., Inference is that 
which is present in the subject of iDference and abo in things similar to it and which is abaenl from where 
the inferable property is non-emtent. Definition of probans : grahyadbannastadamsena vyapto hetuh. 
16 Tbecootroversy regarding ca.nparison .. a separate instrument of valid knowledge is very ancient. We fmd 
certain referenc:es of this in Nyaya-manjari and Nyaya-Kummanja1i. e.g., NM, pp. 129-30; NKM. W. 
193-204 
O. Jha in his 'The Nyayuutma of Gautama' (fu. P. 198) says: In cbapter IV of his Pramana-aamuccaya 
Dignaaa objeas to upamana as a separate instrument of cognition; he includes it under perceplion. 
Uddyotakara sayl that comparilOD does not differfrom perception and word. (But agama is not aGnitted .. 
a separate instrument ofvalid knowledge by the Buddhists.) (vide Catur., p. 3S6). Vasubandhu accepIed 
agama as a separate instrument of valid knowledge. (vide BL I, fu. p. 72) 
Stcherbataky : The Buddhists from the time of Dignaga fall in line with the Vaisesikas. They adnUt only 
two differeot sources of knowledge, which they call perception and inference. Verb&! testimony and 
reasoning by analogy is for them included in iDference. (BL. I, p. 72) 
Though the Vaisesikas and the Buddhists advocate for two instruments ofvalid knowledge, perception and 
iDference, still the Naiyayikas are not 10 much objergatory towanla the Vaisesikas as they are against the 
Buddhists. Only it was Udayana who gave a stroo.g objedioo to the theory of two 'instrumeJ1ll of valid 
knowledge' of the Vaisesilw. 
11. .Cbapter V of Pramana-aamuccaya contains the doctrine of Apoba. 
18 Fragments from Dignagahave been found in aeveraUogica1 te:ltsoflndianphilosoply. Besides, also a large 
number of reconstructloo works of Dignaga'. tens has beM done by a number of scholars of different 
COUDtries. Translations in different languages from the e:llllDt OUneae and Tibetan translationl are abo 
available. vide The Encydopedia of Indian philosopilies, vol I, W. SI-SS 
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19 kutar\cikajl'.lmanivrttihetuh karisyate tasya maya nibandhahl/ 
NV, vide Catur., P. 6 
20 kutarldkairdignagaprabhnibhih. 
NVn. vide Catur., p. 23 
21 ActlJal verses of Dignaga's Pramana-samuccaYIl (chap. II) are [oood quoted in VTT on NS i.l.S. 
22 Udayana in his third chapler of his Almatattvaviveka discusse,. in a great detail, the Buddhist view of quality 
and qualified. 
23 Recognition is considered by Uddyotakara as a strong ground to estabt lh the exislence of soo1. It is seen 
that recognition is a strong argument in Nyaya-manjari. (Ref. NM. pt. lI,p. 11). In NKM (I. 15) also we fmd: 
nanyadrstam smaratyanyo naikam bhutarnapakramatl 
vasanasarnkramo nasti na ca gatyantaram sthirell 
Remembrance also a ground which has been shown repe.'lledly in favour of a permanent soul. 
In this connection it should be mentioned that though Uddyotakara elaborately refuleS this ancient view that 
rejects the reality of the soul, Uddyotakara himself does not admit that such a view was true to the real 
teachings of the Buddha. 
24 BL, I, pp. ISO-I 
25 The first half of the verse found in Pramana-viniscaya. The Tib. version runs as fonows : Ihan-cig dmigs-pa 
nes-pa'i phyir/snon dan de blo gzan ma yin} (mOo xcv II. fol'263b). But the second half is not found in 
verse form though the idea contained there has been clarified in prose. The verse form is found in 
Pramana-vartika. 
26 BL, I, p. 39 
27 vide Preface ofTattvasamgraha. 
28 Manorathanandin in his Pramanavartika-vrtti mentirns one Sankarasvamin as acaryiya whose view was 
criticised by Dharmakirti. vide Pramana-vartika, p. 143 
In Nyayamanjari-granthi-bhanga, CakradharamentionsSankarasvamin as a commentator ofNyaya-bhasya. 
of. Sankarasvami nyayabhasyatikakrt, vide NM(S), n, p. 146 
29 The latest researches seem to justify the Saka era theory and place Vacaspati in 976 A.D. (Date of Vacaspati 
Misrd and Udayanacarya - D.C. Bhattacharya, Jha Research Institute Journal, vol. II, pp. 349-56.) 
vide Ratnakirtinibandhavali, Introduction p.21 f. 
30 N urnerous verses of Pramana-vartika are found quoted. 
artbopnyoge'pi punab smartam sabdanuyojanamJ 
aksadhiryadyapekseta so'rtho vyavahito bhavetl/ 
yah pragajanako buddherupayogavisesatah/ 
sa pascadapi lena syadabapayc'pi netradhih// 
are the verses of Pramana-viniscaya quoled under NS i.1.4. These can he identified with the Tibetan 
translation of the IeAt : don ni ne-bar sbyor-ba na'n/ gun yan sgra sbyor dran-pa 1aJ gal-te dban-po'i bio 
ltos naf don de chod-par 'gyur-ba yinl! gan snon blo-yi skyed-hyed mini ner shyor kbyad-par mOO-pa' i pbyirl 
de ni phyis kyan 'gyur les naf don moo na yan mig blor 'gyurll (fshad-ma mam-parnes-pa, mDoJl.cv. n. 
fol. 253a) 
31 grantharacanavinodadiba hi maya vasarah gamitah. NM(S), II, p.147 
32 kuto va nutanarn vastu vayanl utpreksilum ksamahl 
vacovinyasavaicilramatram atra vicaryatamJ/ NM(S),I, p.5 
na hiyarn kavibhih purvairadrastam suksmadarsibhihl 
sakta tmamapi draslum matirmama tapasvinil/ NM(S), II, p.147 
33.kalpanapodham abhrantam pratyaksam. 
34 A History of Indian Logic, p. ISO. vide also NM(S), I. pp. 91, 159. Those were identified also by Cakra'lh~!l\ 
in his Nyayamanjari-granthi-bhanga. 
35 nastyatma phalabhogarnatramatha ca svargaya caityarccanaml 
salnskarah ksanika yugasthitibhrtascaitc viharah krtah! 
sarvam sunyamidam vasuni gurave dehiti camAyale/ 
bauddhanam caritam kimanyadiyati dambhasya bhurnih paml! 
NM.II,p.39 
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36 A.I... Thakur, "The Naiyayika Trilocana as a teacher of Vaca.spati", Indian Culture 14, 1947,36-40. 
A.I... Thakur, "Nyaya-manjari of Guru Trilocana - a forgotten workn , Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research 
Society (pama) 41,1955.507·11. 
Collections of different views of Trilocana ~rom the works of Joanasri and others can be a valuable 
contnbution to the Indian philosophical studies. 
37 Viuoka is mentillfled several times in Isvamvada of Jnanasri. vide Jnaoa.srimitranibandhavali, pp. 235, 237. 
242-3.255,260. Also vide Ratn!lkirtinibandhavali, p. 47 
38 "The name of this scholar does not actually occur in these works. Jnanasrimitm introduces his views as those 
of a 'a certain scholar' (aparah) (lsvaravada, pp. 237,255). The marginal notes supply the lacuna. Now what 
we could gather about this scholar is this: Satananda wrote some tract on Nyaya philosophy in which the 
refutatillfl of the Buddhist position wi th regard to Isvara occured. The five arguments put against the Buddhist 
positillfl by him have been proved ineffective in the Isvaravada. 
Jnanasrimitm-nibandhavali, Introduction, p.22. 
39 n ... Jnaoa.srimitra had to face a number of scholars who weilded considrable importance at his time. Many 
important texts he consul1ed are now lost and perhaps irrepa~ly. In the Nyaya system the works of highest 
importance only have been preserved. Those intervening between two such WOlXs are lost. Sometimes their 
views were quoted anllflymously in later works. Thus some of the older views IlfIlsvara can now be tmced 
in N yaya-kusumanjali of Udayana. But the Buddhist and laina authors have preserved passages from ancient 
masters with proper reference to their authors. Jnanasrimitra is responsible for preserving actual passages 
from the works of many important scholars that came between Dharmakirti and Udayana and thus his 
Nibandhas became an important document to a student of Indian Logic". 
Jnanasrimitra-nibandhavali, Introduction, pp. 22-23. 
40 .aisvaryarnadamattah san atmanamavamanyasel 
punarbauddhe samayate madadhina tava sthitiihll 
41 In the 11th century the Buddhists, Jnanasribhadra, Ratnakar&~anti, Yamari, Sankarananda contributed 
voluminous writing on Buddhist thought and logic. In the Nyaya line from the begilUling of the 13th century 
the Naiyayika logicians were much engaged with the philosophy of the New school of Nyaya logic, i.e., 
with Tallvacintamani of Gangesa. 
42 BL, I, p. 35 
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